Drivers of Foreign Policy

Since the peaceful coup that brought the current emeer of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to spot in 1995, Qatar has entered into an more than and more expanding international insurance polity, which has greatly change magnitude the commonwealths regional and international standing. The main feature of Qatars outside policy is its exercise as intermediary and negotiator in a make out of conflicts in the warmness eastward and elsewhere, for eccentric in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen. In each(prenominal) case, Qatar prided itself on engaging with warring factions to tote for political settlements or rapprochement, as fountainhead as providing humanitarian assistance.The decisions governing Qatars confederation in such conflicts are really central. The main decision-makers are the Emir, His Highness sheik Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, anchor take care and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani. Restricting much of the decision-making of this midget encircle has quickly led to foreign (and local) policy decisions, al lowing Qatar to respond quickly to emerging conflicts with interinterintermediation offers.While it can be say that drawing a picture of the country as a benefactor is a public diplomatic move by Qatar since neutrality facilitates the consolidation of credibility among octuple audiences there are deeper motives behind Qatars expansionist approach to mediating the conflict by expanding its foreign policy.The first motive is to maintain its warrantor and stability. Qatar is located in the Arabian Peninsula, an orbit full of political and military rivalries. By increasing its international standing, Qatar aims to protect itself from the dangers of non-disclosure of small and vulnerable states 5 risks of the type suffered by Kuwait in 1990. 6 In addition, by engaging in mediation between conflicting factions such as Houthis and the Yemeni government.Or bet ween al-Jihad and its allies on the one and only(a) sight and the present(a) 14 bloc on the other, Qatar can be seen as assay to contain those conflicts and prevent their spread hand-to-hand to home. This inevitability sticks more acute when one considers the division Iran tactical manoeuvres in those conflicts and in the gulf in particular. Iran is the main backer of al-Jihad and has established links with the Huthis in Yemen and a number of Shiite movements in the Gulf.Qatar as well plowshares the largest fossil oil field in the world with Iran, and is amply aware of Irans expansionist foreign policy objectives in the region. By exhausting to middle between non- Persian actors and their rivals, Qatar is trying to counter Iranian influence in the Middle eastward in general, and more specifically in the Gulf, while maintaining friendly relations with Iran. Thus, in addition to general security concerns, Irans fictional character in the region can be seen as a clear driver behind Qatars mediation of the Middle eastbound conflict.The third motive for Qatari mediation is the desire to expand its influence as a regional worker, especially in the face of Saudi-Arabian Arabia. Saudi Arabia has traditionally played a leading role in conflicts throughout the region, for example during the Lebanese civil war. However, in recent days Saudi mediation has been spoiled for comprehend neutrality, making the Kingdom an active player rather than a neutral intermediary.The pissed relationship between Saudi Arabia and the March 14 political bloc in Lebanon, led by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, is an example. Qatar therefore viewed a clean in the Arab international relations it was trying to bridge. Its involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond is an effort to present itself as a vital preference to Saudi Arabia and a potential unexampled leader in the Middle East.This role was further enhanced by Qatars membership of the Unite d Nations Security Council in 2006-2007, during which the Emirate increased its regional mediation and assistance activities. However, Qatar was dandy not to exceed the limits of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Despite Qatars view of Saudi Arabias low influence in the Middle East (in addition to the growing Iranian influence, which adds to the imperative need for regional Arab leadership), the country clay cautious not to conflict with the kingdoms interior(prenominal) and foreign policies.Thus, when the Bahraini uprising began in 2011, Qatar supported the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led by Saudi Arabia mission to quell the insurgency. 7 When the Yemeni uprising, which began in the same year, gained momentum, Qatar also supported the GCC initiative it managed.The path of rebirth in Yemen, leading to a negotiated novelty instead of overthrowing the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although Qatars relationship with Saudi Arabia over the years has been turbulent, it has fin ally reached a rapprochement in 2008 and has continued to become more entrenched, driven by Qatari realism and the Emirates awareness of the limits of its influence in the Gulf.Saudi Arabia is the dominant political power in the Arabian Peninsula, where Qatar has not merely had the opportunity or the ability to play the first major role. Both countries share concerns about the instability and political passing that are reaching their territory, which leads them to cooperate more than confrontation.